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ABSTRACT
Investigating allegations of child abuse or neglect presents unique challenges,
particularly if parents or guardians are the alleged perpetrators. Those accused of
harming the children are in a position to prevent the victims from getting access to
the help they need to escape their abuser(s). The courts have not clearly defined the
federal constitutional boundaries of searches and seizures in this context. The Su-
preme Court, in particular, has not weighed in on the constitutionality of warrantless
searches and seizures in connection with abuse and neglect investigations. This lack
of Supreme Court guidance has led to unpredictable and sometimes conflicting opinions
from state and lower federal courts, particularly with respect to Fourth Amendment
requirements in this context. This Article will examine whether court orders allowing
searches and seizures in child abuse or neglect cases can be issued based on a stan-
dard lower than probable cause and still pass muster under the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, it discusses the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s war-
rant requirement and weighs arguments in favor of and in opposition to applying the
special needs exception to child abuse and neglect investigations. Finally, the Article
discusses whether searches without a warrant or other court order may be conducted
in response to allegations of child abuse or neglect if the special needs exception
does not apply.
INTRODUCTION
Government workers are tasked with investigating allegations of abuse or neglect
of children. It is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies to most investigative op-
tions involving direct contact with the alleged victim.1 Interviews are searches,2 and
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D., Duke University 1997;
B.A., Duke University 1993.
1 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic
Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413,
469–73 (2005).
2 See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 509–10 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an inves-
tigation on school premises that consisted of interviewing students “easily” met the definition
of a Fourth Amendment search “because the defendants went to the school for the specific
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taking children into custody—even temporarily for the purpose of interviewing
them—involves a seizure.3 What is unclear is under what circumstances these
searches or seizures violate the Fourth Amendment. There are cases that discuss
rather extensively the right to remove children from their parents’ custody without
a warrant (requiring exigent or emergency circumstances and, in some cases, evi-
dence that there was no time to get a court order).4 However, this Article focuses on
the right to search or seize evidence. In other words, to what extent can social work-
ers investigate child abuse allegations without consent or a warrant supported by
probable cause?
Investigating allegations of child abuse or neglect presents unique challenges,
particularly if parents or guardians are the alleged perpetrators. Those accused of
harming the children are in the perfect position to prevent the alleged victims from
getting access to the help they need to escape their abuser(s). In cases in which the
reports of abuse or neglect are insufficient to meet the standard of probable cause
necessary to issue a warrant, there may not be a meaningful investigation.5 Without
the ability to interview or examine the children (both of which constitute searches
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution),6 the government
may be unable to assess whether the allegations of abuse or neglect can be substan-
tiated, much less meet the burden of proof necessary to remove children from an
abusive or neglectful environment. This can be particularly troubling in cases in
which there is little or no opportunity to gather evidence because the children have
limited contact with persons other than the alleged abusers. For example, children
who live in a geographically isolated or culturally insular community may have
limited contact with people who are willing and able to observe and report signs of
abuse. If abuse is suspected, the information gathered may be insufficient to establish
purpose of gathering information, an activity that most certainly constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment”).
3 “A person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view
of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would not have
believed that he was free to leave.” Heck, 327 F.3d at 510; see also Greene v. Camreta, 588
F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, Greene v. Camreta, 661 F.3d 1201, 1201
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an interview of a child at her school was a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming
a district court holding that taking a child from her school to the hospital for examination was
a Fourth Amendment seizure).
4 See, e.g., Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding
that there is no special need that invalidates the warrant requirement unless there are exigent
circumstances); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating a child may
be removed without “judicial authorization” if there is “reasonable cause to believe that the
child is in imminent danger”).
5 See Coleman, supra note 1, at 526.
6 Heck, 327 F.3d at 509; Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 899–900 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a physical examination of a child’s body implicates the Fourth Amendment).
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the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant. Even if the child regularly
interacts with teachers, administrators, child care providers, or others who may be
inclined or required to report suspected abuse, there may not be sufficient evidence
to justify issuance of a warrant to search or seize the child. In other words, without
evidence of abuse, the authorities may be unable to obtain evidence to prove abuse.
On the other hand, giving investigators an unrestricted right to seize and ex-
amine or interview children would be an unnecessary and unwise erosion of Fourth
Amendment rights, especially when those searches and seizures take place at the
alleged victim’s home. Moreover, research has shown that investigations, partic-
ularly those that are unnecessarily intrusive or that separate children from their
caregivers, can be traumatic and psychologically harmful to the children as well as
damaging to the family as a whole.7
While child abuse investigations are typically subject to detailed state regu-
lations,8 the courts have not clearly defined the federal constitutional boundaries of
searches and seizures in this context.9 The Supreme Court, in particular, has not
weighed in on the constitutionality of warrantless searches and seizures in connection
with abuse and neglect investigations.10 This lack of Supreme Court guidance has led
to unpredictable and sometimes conflicting opinions from state and lower federal
courts, particularly with respect to Fourth Amendment requirements in this context.11
Despite the lack of agreement on every issue, a general consensus seems to have
developed on some questions, such as strip searches in the home without parental con-
sent.12 Other issues have divided the courts and resulted in uncertainty for those con-
ducting the investigations and for families that are the targets of such investigations.
In addition to clarifying the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment and its re-
quirements in the context of child abuse investigations, there is a pressing need for
guidance for investigators as well as state legislatures in this area. In some cases,
investigators have acted pursuant to statutes that purport to give them authority to
question children under circumstances that were later held to be unconstitutional.13
7 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 1, at 415, 418–19, 421.
8 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., State Laws on Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD
WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies
/state/can/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
State Laws].
9 See Coleman, supra note 1, at 469–76.
10 See id. at 416.
11 See id.
12 Strip searches of the child in the home without parental consent have been found
to violate the Fourth Amendment. See Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2002); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 820 (9th
Cir. 1999).
13 See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 515–16 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Wisconsin statute under which investigators acted was unconstitutional).
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Now that several circuits have agreed on the broad contours of the Fourth Amendment
and the necessity of obtaining a warrant or equivalent court order in the absence of
consent or exigent circumstances,14 there is an even greater need to explore what
actions are allowed if such a warrant cannot be obtained, as well as what types of
searches should be authorized in the warrant or order.
This Article will begin with a general overview of the procedures for investi-
gating allegations of abuse and neglect in Illinois and Texas. These procedures will
serve as examples of the processes used across the country and will provide context
for the Fourth Amendment issues and arguments discussed in the cases and later
sections of the Article. Part II will discuss the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment in the context of abuse and neglect investigations.
In Part III, this Article will examine whether court orders allowing searches and
seizures in child abuse or neglect cases can be issued based on a standard lower than
probable cause and still pass muster under the Fourth Amendment. Part IV will dis-
cuss the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
and weigh arguments in favor of and in opposition to applying the special needs
exception to child abuse and neglect investigations. Part V will discuss whether
warrantless searches may be conducted in response to allegations of child abuse or
neglect if the special needs exception does not apply. Additionally, Part V explores
what actions are reasonable while interviewing or examining children in the context
of a warrantless search.
I. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INVESTIGATIONS
Procedures for conducting child abuse and neglect investigations are established
by state law.15 The procedures vary from state to state, although there tend to be many
similarities.16 The procedures for Illinois and Texas will be examined below in order
to establish a general understanding of the types of procedures that are typically
14 See Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 420 (5th
Cir. 2008) (requiring consent, exigent circumstances, or a “special need” for a warrantless
entry into the home); Doe, 327 F.3d at 511–13 (holding that probable cause, a warrant, or
exigent circumstances is necessary to conduct a search or seizure of a child on private prop-
erty); Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that seizing a
child from home requires probable cause or exigent circumstances); Wallis v. Spencer, 202
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that removal of a child requires exigent circumstances,
a court order, or consent); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891
F.2d 1087, 1093–94 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a strip search of a child in the home requires
a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances).
15 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., State Laws, supra note 8.
16 See Kate Hollenbeck, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Child Abuse Registries at
the Intersection of Child Protection, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 1, 13–14 (2001).
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employed across the nation and to provide context for some of the cases and issues
that are discussed in later sections of the Article.17
A. Illinois
1. Report to State Central Register
In Illinois, all reports of child abuse or neglect should be made to the State
Central Register (SCR).18 Reports can be made twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week to the telephone hotline or local Department of Child and Family Services
(DCFS) offices.19 Reports are screened by call floor workers who complete a State
Automated Child Welfare Information System (SACWIS) intake form.20 The call
worker must also elicit additional information, including: the reasons why the re-
porter has reasonable cause to believe that abuse or neglect has occurred and the
source of the reporter’s information; any knowledge regarding the risk of harm to
the child; any knowledge of potential danger to DCFS investigators; any knowledge of
the mental and physical condition of the alleged perpetrator; any knowledge about the
child, family, or perpetrator’s ability to communicate with the Investigation Specialist
(i.e., language barriers or hearing impairment); “identity and location of possible wit-
nesses to, or persons with knowledge of, the alleged abuse or neglect”; and direc-
tions to any relevant addresses.21
17 The discussion of the Illinois and Texas procedures is intended to provide an overview
and not a comprehensive or exhaustive explanation of the statutes or procedures in effect in
either jurisdiction.
18 ILL. DEP’T OF CHILD & FAMILY SERVS., REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
PROCEDURES, § 300.20(a) (Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter ILL. DEP’T OF CHILD & FAMILY SERVS.,
PROCEDURES], available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/policy/pr_policy_procedure.shtml.
19 Id. The hotline number is 1-800-25A-BUSE. Id. Reports to the hotline go directly to
the SCR. Id. If someone calls a local office to make a child abuse or neglect report, that
person will be encouraged to call the hotline to make the report. Id. Individuals who go to
local offices to report child abuse or neglect will be directed to and assisted with making a
report to the hotline. Id.
20 Id. § 300.30(a)(1) (Nov. 20, 2009). Once the form is completed,
[i]ncidents of suspected child abuse or neglect reported to the De-
partment are classified as physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect or a
combination of the preceding three and recorded in the State Central
Register’s Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System
(SACWIS). The SACWIS enables the Department to identify and lo-
cate prior reports of child abuse or neglect; monitor the current status
of reports of child abuse or neglect being provided services under the
Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act; and regularly evaluate the
effectiveness of existing laws and programs through statistical analysis
and other information.
Id. at app. B § (a) (May 20, 2002).
21 Id. § 300.30(a)(1) (Nov. 20, 2009).
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Not every call or allegation of neglect or abuse will qualify as a report of child
abuse or neglect. In order for a child abuse or neglect report to be taken, specified
criteria must be met, including a requirement that the reporter “have reasonable
cause to believe that a child has been abused or neglected; and [that] [t]he alleged
victim must be less than 18 years of age; and [t]he alleged victim must either have
been harmed or must be in substantial risk of harm.”22 If the child abuse or neglect
report criteria are met and the allegations fit the definition of child abuse or neglect in
the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (ANCRA), an initial investigation will
be conducted.23 The rules do not specifically address anonymous reports.24 Presum-
ably, reports from an anonymous source will be taken and investigated in the same
manner as other reports, although it may be more difficult to assess the credibility
of anonymous sources.25
Child abuse or neglect reports are then placed in one of ten categories, includ-
ing: emergency, normal, child five years of age or less, child currently alone or
22 Id. § 300.30(a)(2) (emphasis omitted). The complete list of criteria is as follows:
• The reporter must have reasonable cause to believe that a child
has been abused or neglected; and
• The alleged victim must be less than 18 years of age; and
• The alleged victim must either have been harmed or must be in
substantial risk of harm; and
• There must be a specific abusive or neglectful incident which falls
within the description of an allegation which caused the harm to
the child, or a set of circumstances that lead a reasonable person
to believe that a child is at risk of harm; and
• If the allegations presented were true, the situation would con-
stitute abuse or neglect as defined in Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act (ANCRA) and as interpreted in the allegations def-
initions contained in Procedures 300, Appendix B.
• For abuse, the alleged perpetrator must be the child’s parent, im-
mediate family member, any individual who resides in the same
home as the child, any person who is responsible for the child’s
welfare at the time of the incident, or the paramour of the child’s
parent, or any person who came to know the child through an offi-
cial capacity or position of trust. Alleged perpetrators of abuse
must be over ten years of age.
• For neglect, the alleged perpetrator must be the child’s parent or
any other person that is over the age of ten years who was respon-
sible for the child at the time of the alleged neglect.
Id.
23 Id.
24 In fact, the only time anonymous reports are mentioned is in Appendix B to the Pro-
cedures, addressing allegations of inadequate supervision. In that section, it states in the case
of an anonymous report, “an interview must be conducted with an individual (collateral) who
has (or would likely have) knowledge of the family situation and/or reported incident.” Id.
at app. B § (c)(2)(J) (May 20, 2002).
25 See id. at app. B § (b)(1) (May 20, 2002).
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unsupervised, immediate medical attention needed, child dead, facility report, child
at hospital with perpetrator present, child held by police or a physician, other action
needed.26 Each category has an associated required response.27 Reports that are placed
in the normal response category require a response within twenty-four hours.28 An
emergency response is required if a child is in “immediate danger of physical harm”
or “[i]t is likely that the family of [an] alleged child victim will flee with the child.”29
In those circumstances, SCR must “call the local police and . . . the Investigation
Specialist [must] respond immediately” by initiating an investigation “without delay
at any hour of the day or night.”30
2. Initial Investigation
DCFS staff members that have been designated as Investigation Specialists con-
duct the investigations of child abuse or neglect reports.31 “The purpose of the initial
investigation is to determine whether a report of alleged child abuse or neglect is a
good faith indication of potential abuse or neglect and, therefore, warrants a formal
investigation.”32 Investigation Specialists must complete a list of activities during the
initial investigation, including: review of the intake and any prior indicated or un-
founded investigations on file; development of “an investigative plan with the Inves-
tigative Supervisor and law enforcement, if appropriate”; “in-person contact with the
alleged victim or victims”; interviews with the alleged victim or victims, reporters,
and other persons with information; and verification of the identity of “alleged per-
petrators, adult household members, and frequent adult visitors to the home.”33
26 Id. § 300.30(h) (Nov. 20, 2009).
27 Id.
28 Id. § 300.30(h)(2)(A).
29 Id. § 300.30(h)(1).
30 Id. (emphasis omitted).
31 Id. § 300.50.
32 Id. § 300.50(a).
33 Id. The complete list of mandatory investigative activities is as follows:
• Review the intake, and prior indicated and unfounded investi-
gations on file.
• Review the contact and evidence requirements for current
allegations.
• Develop an investigative plan with Investigation Supervisor and
law enforcement, if appropriate, to ensure required contacts are
completed and evidence is gathered.
• Initiate the report within the 24-hour mandate in accordance with
subsection 300.50(c) by in-person contacts or good faith attempts.
• In-person contact with the alleged victim or victims.
• In-person examination of the child victim or victims’ environment.
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The investigation must be initiated by either “in-person contact with the alleged
child victim or victims within [twenty-four] hours of the receipt of the report, or by
a good faith attempt to contact the alleged child victim or victims.”34 The interview
of the victim must be conducted in accordance with specific procedures developed
for different types of harm.35 In accordance with procedure:
The interviews shall be conducted out of the presence of the
child’s caretaker and the alleged perpetrator if at all possible. . . .
Another person whom the child trusts but who is not the alleged
perpetrator or another alleged child victim . . . may be present
during the interview if it will make the child more comfortable.36
Investigation Specialists are to contact the parents or caretakers in person on the
same day that the alleged child victims are interviewed.37 If contact is not possible
• Interview the alleged child victims or victims, reporters, other per-
sons with information, and other identified persons to obtain infor-
mation pertaining to the alleged incident of abuse or neglect.
• Observe the alleged victim or victims in accordance with the
requirements of subsection 300.50(c)(9).
• Verify identification of alleged perpetrators, adult household
members, and frequent adult visitors to the home through Social
Security Numbers and photographic identifications (e.g., driver’s
license, employee identification).
• Complete data checks and SOUNDEX on members of the house-
hold.
• Complete LEADS [Law Enforcement Agencies Data Systems]
check in accordance with Administrative Procedure #6.
• Complete required minimal investigative activities for the alleged
allegation that are identified in Procedures 300, Appendix B.
• Document all investigative activities within 24-hours after they are
completed.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
34 Id. § 300.50(c) (emphasis omitted).
35 Id. Different reporting and investigation procedures are set out for death; head injuries;
internal injuries; burns; poisons or noxious substances; wounds; bone fractures; substantial
risk of physical injury or environment injurious to health and welfare; cuts, bruises, abra-
sions, and oral injuries; human bites; sprains or dislocations; tying or close confinement;
substance misuse; torture; mental and emotional impairment; sexually transmitted diseases;
sexual penetration; sexual exploitation; sexual molestation; substantial risk of sexual injury;
inadequate supervision; abandonment or desertion; inadequate food; inadequate shelter; in-
adequate clothing; medical neglect; failure to thrive (non-organic); environmental neglect;
and malnutrition (non-organic). Id. at app. B § (e) (May 20, 2002).
36 Id. § 300.50(c)(8) (Nov. 20, 2009).
37 Id. § 300.50(c)(10).
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at that time, the “contact must be attempted no later than [twenty-four] hours after
the Investigation Specialist observes and assesses the safety of the children.”38
3. Observation of the Child
In addition to interviewing the child, it may be necessary for the Investigation
Specialist to examine the child to verify or refute allegations of injury.39 If the report
alleges external marks or injuries as a result of neglect or abuse and, based on the
information obtained from the investigation or other credible sources, there is “rea-
sonable cause to believe that an observation will reveal marks [or] injuries supporting
the allegation,”40 the investigator should attempt to view those marks or injuries only
in the presence of “a parent[,] guardian or other professional person, preferably of
the same sex as the child.”41 If the investigator discovers information indicating that
the child has external marks or injuries on other parts of the child’s body, those marks
or injuries should also be observed.42 If the marks or injuries are on a part of the body
that normally would be covered by a bikini bathing suit and the child is age six or
above, then the observing investigator must be of the same sex as the child.43 If the
child to be observed is verbal, the investigator should explain the purpose of the obser-
vation in words that the child can understand.44
If the child’s clothes must be “adjusted or removed” in order for the investigator
to observe the alleged marks or injuries, the investigator should “make a good faith
effort” to get the parent or guardian’s consent to the observation.45 If the parent or
guardian is not present at the place where the observation is to take place, the inves-
tigator must attempt to notify the parent or guardian of the necessity of observing
the child for external marks or injuries.46 The investigator must call any emergency
numbers left by the parent or guardian and must consult local telephone books and
directory assistance if the parent or guardian has not left any emergency numbers
or cannot be reached at those numbers.47
38 Id. If the children are judged to be safe and the alleged perpetrators are not the parents or
caretakers, “the Investigation Specialist shall contact the alleged perpetrators within [seven]
calendar days” of the initial report. Id. (emphasis omitted). Contact can be delayed at the re-
quest of law enforcement. Id.
39 Id. § 300.50(c)(8).
40 Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(A)(ii). “A report by a mandated reporter shall be deemed to be
‘reasonable cause’ under this paragraph.” Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(A)(iii).
41 Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(A).
42 Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(A)(iii).
43 Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(A).
44 Id.
45 Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(A)(iii). Those efforts may include (but are not limited to) a request for
the parent or guardian’s assistance with moving or removing the child’s clothes. Id. Compliance
with the request is apparently deemed to be consent to the observation. See id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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If the parent or guardian is located but refuses to cooperate with the investigator
or allow observation of the child, the investigator must notify the parent that the
investigator has a “responsibility” to observe the child.48 The investigator must then
offer the following options:
1. The parent [or] guardian may take the child to a physician or hospital
emergency room for a physical examination within a reasonable time.
The Investigation Specialist will secure a written report from the exam-
ining physician; or
2. The parent [or] guardian may give consent to allow the Investigation
Specialist and another professional (e.g., a school nurse, school teacher,
policeman, etc.) to observe the child.49
If the parent or guardian still refuses to cooperate or allow the observation of
external marks or injuries and “the Investigation Specialist determines that the child
is in imminent risk of harm if left in the custody of the parent [or] guardian, the
Investigation Specialist shall take the child into protective custody and proceed to
have the child examined by a physician.”50 If there is no imminent harm, the child
may not be observed or taken into custody.51 If internal injuries are alleged, the child
must be taken to a physician for examination.52 “An Investigation Specialist shall
never attempt to examine an alleged child victim for internal injuries or attempt to
move a child with internal injuries.”53
Allegations of sexual abuse are handled differently.54 “Investigation Specialists
will not physically examine any child alleged to have been sexually abused. Investi-
gators must follow local office procedures to arrange for the child’s medical exami-





52 Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(B). The Investigation Specialist shall attempt to get the parent or
guardian’s cooperation and consent to taking the child for examination and treatment by a
physician. Id. If the parent cannot be contacted or refuses to take the child for examination
and the child is in imminent risk of harm, the child shall be taken into protective custody, and
the Investigation Specialist shall have the child taken to a hospital emergency room for ex-
amination. Id.
53 Id. (emphasis omitted).
54 Id. § 300.50(c)(9)(C) (“Child advocacy centers are available to a number of Depart-
ment field offices to provide a coordinated multidisciplinary approach to the identification,
treatment, and legal aspects of sexual abuse allegations in accordance with the Children’s
Advocacy Center Act.”).
55 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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field office, “the Investigation Specialist must notify law enforcement and the State’s
Attorney to coordinate a multidisciplinary investigation.”56
The initial investigation should be completed within fourteen days.57 If, at the
end of the initial investigation, it is determined that the alleged victim is not less than
eighteen years of age, the alleged victim was not harmed and is not in substantial
risk of harm, the allegations do not fit the statutory definition of neglect or abuse,
or there is no “eligible perpetrator” as defined by statute, then the report is deter-
mined to be “not a good faith indication of abuse or neglect, [and] the investigation
shall be discontinued.”58 Those reports are categorized as “unfounded.”59 If the ini-
tial investigation reveals that reasonable cause exists to believe that child abuse or
neglect occurred, then the report is “indicated” and a formal investigation must be
conducted.60 A report is “unqualified” if the investigation determines that there is
“not an alleged victim and/or eligible perpetrator of potential abuse or neglect.”61
4. Referrals to Law Enforcement
Law enforcement may become involved in a child abuse or neglect investigation
in many ways. “The Investigation Specialist shall notify the appropriate law enforce-
ment agency and the State’s Attorney of the receipt of reports of Death, Physical Abuse
and Sexual Abuse Harms . . . . This notification shall take place at the commence-
ment of the initial investigation.”62 The rules list several reasons for prompt notifi-
cation, including notifying law enforcement of a possible criminal act, requesting
assistance in protecting the child and the Investigation Specialist, and requesting as-
sistance in preserving evidence and conducting the investigation.63
In some circumstances, law enforcement may take the lead in an investigation.
If law enforcement is investigating the incident that is the basis of the child abuse
or neglect report received by DCFS, that investigation may preempt the DCFS
investigation.64 “[T]he Investigation Specialist may [choose to] delegate the ini-
tiation of the investigation to . . . law enforcement . . . .”65 For example, a report may
be delegated if “[t]he law enforcement agency is already involved in the situation,
an officer had in-person contact with the alleged child victim no longer than one
hour prior to” or within twenty-four hours “after the date and time the CA/N report,
56 Id.
57 Id. § 300.50(k) (July 8, 2010).
58 Id. § 300.50(l).
59 Id.
60 Id. § 300.50(k).
61 Id. § 300.50(m).
62 Id. § 300.50(e)(1) (Aug. 27, 2010).
63 Id.
64 Id. § 300.50(c)(1) (Nov. 20, 2009).
65 Id. § 300.50(c)(2).
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and the officer can attest to the current condition and safety of the alleged child
victim.”66 Neither preemption nor delegation relieves the Investigation Specialist of
the “responsibility for assuring the safety of the alleged child victim, interviewing
the alleged child victim during the course of the investigation, and meeting all inves-
tigative and documentation requirements.”67 Finally, DCFS may conduct investiga-
tions in cooperation with or parallel to a law enforcement investigation.68
B. Texas
The Child Protective Services Division (CPS) of the Texas Department of Family
and Protective Services (DFPS) is responsible for investigating reports of abuse or
neglect of children.69 Reports can be made to the DFPS Statewide Intake (SWI) hot-
line twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.70 Nonemergency situations can also
be reported on the DFPS website.71 While online reports may be made at any time, it
takes up to twenty-four hours for those reports to be processed.72 Moreover, reporters
must create an account and login (or login as a guest) to access the reporting website.73
Anonymous reports can be made via the hotline.74
SWI intake workers gather as much information from the reporter as possible to
determine whether the report meets the criteria for CPS investigation and assessment.75
If the case is referred to CPS, it is assigned an initial level of priority based on the per-
ceived current risk to the child.76 If the report indicates that a child faces an immediate
risk of serious harm or death, the report is designated Priority 1 (P1).77 If a report is
66 Id.
67 Id. (emphasis omitted).
68 Id. § 300.50(c)(3)–(4) (Jan. 5, 2011).
69 About Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), TEX. DEPT. OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE
SERVS., http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Child_Protection/About_Child_Protective_Services/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2012).
70 Child Protective Services Handbook, TEX. DEPT. OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVS.
§ 2000, http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/handbooks/CPS/Menu/MenuCPS2000.asp (last visited
Oct. 14, 2012) [hereinafter CPS Handbook].
71 Report Abuse, Neglect, or Exploitation, TEX. DEPT. OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVS.,
http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Contact_Us/report_abuse.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
72 Id.
73 Texas Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation Reporting System, TEX. DEPT. OF FAMILY
AND PROTECTIVE SERVS., http://www.txabusehotline.org/Login/Default.aspx (last visited
Oct. 14, 2012).
74 Id.
75 CPS Handbook, supra note 70, § 2110.
76 Id. A CPS supervisor, SWI supervisor, or CPS investigation screener reviews the report
and approves or changes the intake worker’s decision. Id. The supervision or screener must
document reasons for changing the intake worker’s decision. Id.
77 Id. § 2142. A report will also qualify as P1 if the report alleges abuse or neglect within
twelve months after a prior investigation was closed as “Unable to Complete,” or if the report
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accepted for investigation but does not qualify as P1, then it is assigned as Priority 2
(P2).78 The final category is Priority None (PN) which applies to reports in which:
[t]here does not appear to be a reasonable likelihood that a
child will be abused or neglected in the foreseeable future; . . .
[t]he allegations are too vague or general to determine whether
a child has been, or is likely to be, abused or neglected; [or] [t]he
report does not give enough information to locate the child’s
family or household.79
1. Initial Investigation
The purpose of investigating reports of abuse is to protect children.80 In most
cases, the CPS worker will conduct a “thorough investigation[ ],”81 which requires
the following actions by the worker:
• Check the abuse and neglect backgrounds of every member
of the family and home, unless an exception to this require-
ment is met;
• Interview and examine each alleged victim; 
• Interview and examine other children in the home who may
have been abused or neglected but were not named as al-
leged victims in the intake report;
• Interview each of the alleged victim’s parents who are living
in the home. If both parents (or the only parent) in the home
alleges the death of a child due to abuse or neglect (regardless of whether there are surviving
children in the house). Id.
The handbook lists (among others) the following examples of P1 reports: “a child has
sustained a serious physical injury from the alleged abuse or neglect”; “a child is alleged to
be sexually abused and in immediate danger of further abuse”; “a preschool child is left
alone”; “a child is abandoned or totally without parental supervision, family resources, per-
sonal resources, or community support[;] [n]o responsible adult is close by to offer limited
supervision, and the child is in immediate danger of serious physical harm”; “a child is in
immediate danger of death or serious physical harm because the child lacks basic physical
necessities or medical attention as a result of alleged neglect”; or, “a child’s caretaker be-
haves in a bizarre, psychotic, or extremely intoxicated or drugged manner and abuse or ne-
glect is alleged.” Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. § 2210 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.301(d) (West 2011)).
81 Id. § 2224. Alternative investigation types include: “abbreviated investigations, which
begin as thorough investigations but are truncated when circumstances indicate that a
thorough investigation is unnecessary; unable to complete investigations, in which the family
cannot be located . . . or refuse[s] to cooperate with the investigation; and preliminary inves-
tigations, which must be administratively closed because CPS lacks jurisdiction.” Id.
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are alleged perpetrators, then the worker must also interview
a collateral with relevant information or a principal who is
not an alleged victim or perpetrator;
• Interview each alleged perpetrator, unless an exception to
this requirement is met;
• Visit the home, unless the worker can confirm or rule out
the abuse or neglect without the visit; and
• Check the criminal background of each alleged perpetrator,
unless an alleged perpetrator is a child who is also alleged
to be a victim.82
These actions should be completed within thirty days of the date of the intake.83
If an anonymous report of child abuse or neglect is made to DFPS, “the depart-
ment shall conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is any
evidence to corroborate the report.”84 The preliminary investigation may include a
visit to the child’s home, an interview of the child, parents, and anyone else with rele-
vant knowledge, and an examination of the child.85 “Unless the department deter-
mines that there is some evidence to corroborate the report of abuse, the department
may not conduct the thorough investigation required by this chapter or take any ac-
tion against the person accused of abuse.”86
The interview of the alleged victim may take place “at any reasonable time and
place, including the child’s home or school.”87 In order to interview the child at home,
the worker must obtain the parent’s consent.88 If the CPS worker seeks to interview the
child at school and the parent is present, then the parent must consent to the interview.89
If the parent is not present but has already refused to give DFPS consent to interview
the child, then CPS workers may not interview the child at school.90 If the parent is
not present at the school and has not already refused consent, the worker may
82 Id. § 2224.1.
83 Id. § 2270. All investigation activities should be documented and submitted for super-
visor approval within forty-five days after the date of the intake, and the investigation should
be approved and closed within sixty days after the date of the intake. Id.
84 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.304(a) (West 2011).
85 Id. § 261.304(b).
86 Id. § 261.304(c).
87 CPS Handbook, supra note 70, § 2241.
88 Id. § 2241.1. Consent must be voluntary and not due to coercion or duress. Id. § 2245.14
“The standard is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would believe he or she
is free to refuse consent.” Id. Consent to interview the child does not give the worker the
right to search the entire home unless exigent circumstances exist. Id. § 2245.17. “A case-
worker can search closets and other areas of the home that the parents have not given consent
to search only when: exigent circumstances are present; and the search is necessary to avoid
immediate danger to the child.” Id.
89 Id. § 2241.1.
90 Id.
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interview the child.91 If the parent refuses to grant consent to the interview at home
or school, the worker must seek a court order, which will be granted “for good cause
shown.”92 If exigent circumstances exist, the worker can remove the child from the
home or school without a court order.93
The interview must be an in-person, face-to-face interview and should normally
be conducted in private without any third parties present.94 A third party may be pres-
ent if his or her presence will improve the quality of the interview or make the child
feel more comfortable, but not if his or her presence will compromise the integrity
of the investigation.95 All interviews must be audio- or videotaped.96 “The worker
follows protocol to keep the number of interviews with a child to a minimum, while
also being thorough, and exercises professional judgment and expertise in determin-
ing the nature, extent, and number of interviews and examinations.”97
The worker may also need to examine the alleged victim and any other children in
the home for signs of abuse or neglect.98 All observations from the examinations must
be documented by photographs.99 If the parent is present, the parent must consent to
the examination.100 If the parent refuses to give consent, then the worker can seek a
court order.101 When the examination involves areas “under the child’s clothing,” work-
ers are advised to take precautions and be sensitive to the age and gender of the child.102
91 Id.
92 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.303(b) (West 2011) (“If admission to the home, school, or
any place where the child may be cannot be obtained, then for good cause shown the court
having family law jurisdiction shall order the parent, the person responsible for the care of
the children, or the person in charge of any place where the child may be to allow entrance
for the interview, examination, and investigation.” (emphasis added)).
93 CPS Handbook, supra note 70, § 2241.1; see also id. §2245.2 (“Exigent circumstances
to enter a home exist only when the worker and supervisor determine that: CPS has evidence
that a child is in immediate danger; and CPS’s purpose for entering the home is to prevent
immediate danger and protect the child. If the child would be safe during a delay to gather
more information or obtain a court order, then exigent circumstances are not present.”).
94 Id. § 2241.2.
95 Id.
96 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.302(e) (West 2011); CPS Handbook, supra note 70,
§ 2241.2.
97 CPS Handbook, supra note 70, § 2241.2.
98 Id. § 2250.
99 Id. § 2251.1.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. The precautions further advise:
The younger the child, the more likely it is to be necessary to visually
inspect the child, particularly if he or she is non-verbal. . . . The ex-
amination must be done by a worker of the same gender as the child,
whenever possible. If this is not possible, at a minimum, the caseworker
must have another adult (such as another caseworker, a school nurse, a
teacher, a parent, and so on) present throughout the examination.
Id.
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“Caseworkers must never conduct sexual abuse examinations themselves . . . .”103
Such examinations may only be conducted by medical professionals and with the con-
sent of a parent.104 If a parent refuses to give consent, the examination can only be
conducted if a court order is obtained.105
At the end of the investigation the worker must assign a disposition to each alle-
gation included on the intake.106 The two primary dispositions are: “reason to believe”
and “ruled out.”107 If, based on a preponderance of evidence, CPS concludes that abuse
or neglect has occurred, then CPS finds “reason to believe.”108 If, based on the avail-
able information, CPS determines that it is reasonable to conclude that the abuse or
neglect has not occurred, then CPS rules out abuse.109 “‘Available information,’ in
the context of the ‘ruled out’ disposition, is the evidence that the worker gathered
through the required and supplemental actions he or she took to conduct a thorough
or an abbreviated investigation.”110
If there are multiple allegations, then an overall disposition is assigned based
upon the separate dispositions for each allegation.111
103 Id. § 2251.2.
104 Id.
105 Id.




110 Id. There are other dispositions as well. Id. The disposition is “Unable to Complete” if
“Before staff could draw a conclusion, the persons involved in the allegation moved and could
not be located, or the family refused to cooperate with the investigation.” Id. “Unable to Deter-
mine” is assigned when Staff conclude that “there is not a preponderance of the evidence that
abuse or neglect occurred; it is not reasonable to conclude that abuse or neglect has not oc-
curred; and the family did not move and become unable to locate before the worker could
draw a conclusion about the allegation.” Id. A disposition of “Preliminary Investigation[ ]”
or “Administrative Closure” is assigned when “[i]nformation received after a case was as-
signed for investigation reveals that continued CPS intervention is unwarranted as outlined
in Item 2224.4, Preliminary Investigations (Administrative Closure).” Id. Finally, a case may
be “Merged in Error” because
[t]wo cases with open investigations can be merged in error. When the
case is subsequently split, the IMPACT system will not allow the
worker to delete the allegations added from the “merged from” case to
the “merged to” case. Therefore, the worker must review the Allegation
window of the formerly “merged to” investigation and give the dis-
position of “merged in error” to allegations that should no longer be a
part of the investigation.
Id.
111 Id. The overall dispositions are assigned as follows:
• Reason to believe: If any allegation disposition is “reason to
believe,” the overall case disposition is “reason to believe.”
• Unable to determine: If any allegation disposition is “unable to
determine” and no allegation disposition is “reason to believe,” the
overall case disposition is “unable to determine.”
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2. Cooperation with Law Enforcement
The Texas Family Code requires law enforcement to refer all reports of child
abuse or neglect to DFPS and likewise requires DFPS to refer all reports of child
abuse or neglect to law enforcement.112 The role of CPS is civil, and CPS policies
are intended to clarify the role of CPS and its responsibility for protecting children.113
CPS staff “must not act as law enforcement agents . . . by gathering evidence or talk-
ing to parents, children, or collaterals for the sole purpose of criminal investigation.”114
CPS staff will provide law enforcement with information collected during the civil
investigation, testify at criminal hearings, and otherwise cooperate with law enforce-
ment.115 Of particular importance is the requirement that DFPS conduct a joint in-
vestigation with law enforcement whenever the intake “alleges that a child has been
or may be the victim of conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that poses an im-
mediate risk of physical or sexual abuse of a child that could result in the death of
or serious harm to the child.”116
II. WARRANT ISSUED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE
The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is intended to ensure that a neutral
party has reviewed the evidence and concluded that the sanctity of the home or the
privacy rights of the individual are not intruded upon arbitrarily.117 The warrant
requirement—or at least the requirement that searches or seizures be conducted
based on probable cause118—should not be dispensed with lightly, even when
• Unable to Complete: If any allegation disposition is “unable to
complete” and no allegation disposition is “reason to believe” or
“unable to determine,” the overall investigation disposition is
“unable to complete.”
• Ruled out: If all allegation dispositions are “ruled out,” the overall
case disposition is “ruled out.”
• Administrative closure: If all allegation dispositions are “ad-
ministrative closure,” the overall disposition is “administrative
closure.”
Id. § 2271.1.
112 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.105 (West 2011) (“All reports received by a local or state
law enforcement agency that allege abuse or neglect by a person responsible for a child’s
care, custody, or welfare shall be referred immediately to the department or the designated
agency. The department or designated agency shall immediately notify the appropriate state
or local law enforcement agency of any report it receives, other than a report from a law
enforcement agency, that concerns the suspected abuse or neglect of a child or death of a
child from abuse or neglect.”).
113 CPS Handbook, supra note 70, § 2510.
114 Id. (emphasis omitted).
115 Id.
116 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.301(f) (West 2011).
117 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967).
118 See, e.g., id. at 357.
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government officials are trying to protect vulnerable children. Consequently, as a
matter of policy, if the allegations or evidence already obtained by the would-be
searchers establish probable cause that a crime has been or is about to be committed,
a warrant or equivalent court order should be obtained (absent exigent circumstances
or consent).119 The Supreme Court has held,
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and
“basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial
basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable cause existed.120
A warrant may not be issued solely based on conclusory statements in an affidavit.121
“Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare con-
clusions of others.”122 Several courts have held that a court order is equivalent to a
warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes in child abuse and neglect investigations.123
If the allegations and evidence are not sufficient to establish probable cause, then
the following questions must be answered: (1) Should something less than probable
cause be sufficient for a warrant to be issued in child abuse or neglect investigations?
(2) Does the special needs exception to the warrant requirement apply? (3) Is a war-
rantless search permissible in the absence of the special needs exception, probable
cause, or exigent circumstances?
119 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
120 Id. at 238–39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)).
121 Id. at 239.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir. 1999) (“In the context of a
seizure of a child by the State during an abuse investigation, as the district court recognized, a
court order is the equivalent of a warrant.”). It is interesting to note that state laws may authorize
issuance of a court order based upon something other than probable cause. For example, in
Texas, a family law court may order the parent or guardian to allow entry into the home and
allow an interview of the child based upon a showing of “good cause.” Roe v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407 n.15 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.303 (West Supp. 2002)). But see Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030
n.19 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, Greene v. Camreta, 661 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Oregon statutes which allow caseworkers to obtain a court order for an in-school interview by
submitting an affidavit stating facts that constitute probable cause that a child has been abused);
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 862 F. Supp. 962, 975 & n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that reason-
able cause in family court proceedings is equivalent to probable cause in criminal proceedings).
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III. COURT ORDER BASED ON LESS THAN PROBABLE CAUSE
In very limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has authorized searches based
on something less than probable cause.124 In Safford Unified School District No. 1
v. Redding,125 the Court referenced its holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O.126 that a lesser
standard should apply to searches of students in a public school setting:
In T.L.O., we recognized that the school setting “requires some
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to
justify a search,” and held that for searches by school officials
“a careful balancing of governmental and private interests sug-
gests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amend-
ment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable
cause.” We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion
to determine the legality of a school administrator’s search of a
student, and have held that a school search “will be permissible in
its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”127
While this language appears to authorize searches based on reasonable suspicion
under some circumstances, the T.L.O. case has been regarded as the first recognition
of the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.128
To the extent that courts have already rejected application of the “special needs” ex-
ception,129 this case or its successors cannot be relied upon as sanctioning searches
based on reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause.130
However, rejecting the special needs exception does not bar courts from recog-
nizing that while child abuse and neglect investigations do not fit easily within the
rationale underlying that exception, the need to protect children provides a justifica-
tion for recognizing a different exception to the warrant requirement. The standard
124 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009).
125 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
126 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
127 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2639. (citation omitted) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985)).
128 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Only in those exceptional cir-
cumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”).
129 See, e.g., Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding “special
needs” inapplicable because the purpose of child abuse investigations is to gather evidence);
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 605–06 (2d Cir. 1999).
130 See Coleman, supra note 1, at 474–75.
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applied in abuse and neglect cases need not be identical to the special needs standard
and could be tailored to fit the circumstances raised by abuse and neglect cases.
The need for a less rigorous standard for investigative child abuse searches exists
because there may be no means by which social workers can evaluate abuse allega-
tions without conducting a search of the home or an interview of the children. This
is particularly true if the parents or guardians are the alleged perpetrators and if the
children are isolated from other members of society. For instance, a young child may
not attend school or preschool and may have little or no contact with adults other than
the potentially abusive parent(s). Consequently, there may be little or no opportunity
to investigate abuse or neglect allegations without the cooperation of the parents
(which is unlikely if the allegations are true) or the ability to search the home or
interview the child. Obtaining a warrant may likewise be impossible. A report of
abuse may not provide sufficient information to qualify as probable cause to support
a search warrant. Absent some other authority to investigate the allegations, no in-
vestigation may take place.
Parents have understandably objected to a lower standard, arguing that the gov-
ernment’s right to interfere in their decisions as parents must be limited.131 While this
viewpoint is valid, it does not address the need to protect children from parents who
are harming, or allowing others to harm, their children. A standard that balances pri-
vacy interests with the need to protect those unable to protect themselves is neces-
sary to protect rights without unnecessarily sacrificing the safety of children.
This balance can be struck by requiring investigators to obtain a court order to
interview children, but requiring only reasonable belief instead of probable cause for
the issuance of the order. Because a government worker would still need to present
facts to a judge—a neutral party—in order to obtain the order, workers are protected
and will not bear the burden of relying on their own judgment in difficult cases.
More important, it protects the parents and children that are the targets of investi-
gation. While perhaps more burdensome than warrantless searches, this middle
ground approach recognizes the sanctity of the home and parent-child relationship,
while still providing a mechanism for protecting children who are alleged victims
of abuse and neglect.
131 One group that is particularly well-organized in their opposition is the Home School
Legal Defense Association (HSLDA). Many parents who home school their children do so
because of a distrust of the public school system, and some may harbor suspicions about the
government in general. They are particularly opposed to social worker investigations because
they believe that government officials will treat them less favorably than other families be-
cause of the government’s perceived negative opinion of home-schooling families. See Summer
A. Duke, Comment, Standard Bearers of the Fourth Amendment: The Curious Involvement
of Home School Advocates in Constitutional Challenges to Child Abuse Investigations, 73
UMKC L. REV. 137, 140–42 (2004); see also Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid:
Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (2008) (dis-
cussing HSLDA legal challenges).
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This approach is also consistent with current practice in many states.132 As
discussed above, Texas requires workers to obtain a court order if the parent refuses
to allow the child to be interviewed or examined.133 The court will issue an order
on “good cause shown.”134 The statute could be amended to lower the standard to
“reasonable belief” for all court orders in abuse and neglect situations, or a separate
statute could be drafted to address situations in which the worker has a “reasonable
belief” but does not have evidence that rises to the level of probable cause.135 If only
the lower standard can be met, the court could issue an order authorizing a more
limited search and seizure. Rather than give the worker broad authority to conduct
an interview or inspection, the order could limit the place, duration, and scope of the
interview or observation of the child.136
IV. SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable government intrusion.137
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding whether the search of a home or the
seizure and interview of a child in the course of a child abuse or neglect investiga-
tion violates the Fourth Amendment if the search or seizure is conducted without a
warrant supported by probable cause.138 Some states have regulations authorizing
warrantless searches or seizures in specified circumstances,139 but state law cannot
authorize conduct that violates the United States Constitution.140
132 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.303(b) (West 2011).
133 Id.; see discussion supra Part I.B.
134 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.303(b).
135 It should be noted that some courts have already held that “reasonable cause” in family
court proceedings is equivalent to probable cause in criminal proceedings. Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 862 F. Supp. 962, 975 & n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). To the extent that the court treats
“reasonable cause” as requiring the same level of proof required to meet the probable cause
standard, this author’s proposal represents a change. If the court recognizes that reasonable
cause is a lower standard, this author simply agrees with that court’s assertion.
136 The statute merely states:
If admission to the home, school, or any place where the child may be
cannot be obtained, then for good cause shown the court having family
law jurisdiction shall order the parent, the person responsible for the care
of the children, or the person in charge of any place where the child may
be to allow entrance for the interview, examination, and investigation.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.303(b) (West 2011). The statute does not place any limitations
or restrictions on the workers once the order has been obtained. Id.
137 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that warrantless
eavesdropping of a telephone both was an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 129–30.
139 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.303(b).
140 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a Georgia
law requiring candidates for state office to submit to a drug test as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
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Many state courts and federal district and appellate courts have addressed this
issue but have not reached uniform conclusions.141 A few have held that the special
needs exception to the warrant requirement applies in child abuse investigations.142
Others reject the exception because of law enforcement involvement in such inves-
tigations.143 Confusion persists because the United States Supreme Court has not
weighed in on the issue.144
The Supreme Court recognized the special needs exception to the warrant re-
quirement in New Jersey v. T.L.O.145 In that case the Court upheld a warrantless
search of a student’s purse by public school officials.146 While students retain a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy while at school, the Court recognized that requiring
a warrant before searching students suspected of possessing contraband or otherwise
violating rules designed to promote order or protect student safety would pose an
undue burden on the schools.147
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in
concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and admin-
istrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not
require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based
on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has
violated or is violating the law.148
The test for Fourth Amendment compliance was “reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.”149 In order to be reasonable, the search must be justi-
fied at its inception and must be conducted in a manner that is “reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place[.]”150
141 See supra note 123; see also Coleman, supra note 1, at 470–71 n.170.
142 See, e.g., Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
143 See, e.g., Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roe v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 406 (5th Cir. 2002).
144 See Coleman, supra note 1, at 416.
145 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
146 Id. at 340. “Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when
‘the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search’ we hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a stu-
dent who is under their authority.” Id. at 340 (citation omitted) (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
149 Id.
150 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967)); see also Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Pro-
tective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 404 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987)).
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The exception to the warrant requirement will not apply if the policy justifying
the search is impermissibly intertwined with the goals of regular law enforcement.151
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,152 the staff of a public hospital collaborated with
the police to draft and enforce a policy that routinely collected urine samples of
pregnant women suspected of drug abuse.153 The policy was intended to deter drug
abuse and to encourage the pregnant women to enter substance abuse treatment if
necessary.154 In order to facilitate and encourage the women to pursue counseling
or avoid drugs, positive drug test results were shared with the police and the women
were threatened with prosecution.155 Women who failed more than one drug test or
who failed to complete the substance abuse program were arrested and prosecuted.156
Several women filed suit alleging that the policy violated their Fourth Amendment
rights.157 Specifically, they alleged that the tests were conducted without consent and
without a warrant and thus constituted a violation of their right to be free from
unreasonable government searches.158
The Supreme Court noted that the hospital staff members were government
actors and that the urine tests constituted searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.159 The hospital argued that no warrant was necessary because the
searches fit within the special needs exception to the warrant requirement.160 The
Court disagreed, noting that in each of the previous cases in which the special needs
exception was invoked, the “special need” that was advanced was “divorced from
the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”161
[T]he central and indispensable feature of the policy from its
inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients
into substance abuse treatment. This fact distinguishes this case
from circumstances in which physicians or psychologists, in the
course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the
patient herself, come across information that under rules of law
or ethics is subject to reporting requirements, which no one has
challenged here.162
151 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001).
152 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
153 Id. at 71.
154 Id. at 70–72.
155 Id. at 72.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 73.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 76.
160 Id. at 73.
161 Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
162 Id. at 80–81.
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Given the use of law enforcement to enforce the policy and the “extensive involve-
ment of law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy,”163 the case was out-
side of the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.164
Although drug abuse was acknowledged to be a grave problem, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment’s general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspi-
cionless searches necessarily applies to such a policy.”165
Some courts have held that child abuse or neglect investigations trigger the
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.166 However,
the majority of circuits addressing the issue have cited Ferguson as justification for
rejecting the special needs exception.167 Specifically, they note that law enforcement
is often intimately involved in abuse and neglect investigations as a matter of policy
and practice.168
A. Search and Seizure of a Child from a Home
In Gates v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services,169 the plain-
tiffs brought suit against the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services
(TDPRS) and other government entities, alleging violations of their constitutional
rights.170 The claims were based on actions taken in response to a call from a school
official to the state abuse and neglect hotline.171 In the call, the school official de-
scribed various forms of punishment that one of the plaintiffs used to discipline his
son Travis, who was a student at the school.172 Travis suffered from severe psycho-
logical disorders, including an eating disorder that caused him to steal and consume
large amounts of food.173 The plaintiff and the school had conflicting views on how
163 Id. at 84.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 86. “While respondents are correct that drug abuse both was and is a serious
problem, ‘the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what
means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.’” Id. (quoting
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42–43 (2000)). See also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305 (1997) (drug testing for candidates for state offices); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing for railroad employees).
166 See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902–03 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that rea-
sonableness, not probable cause, is the test for whether a visual search of a child without
parental consent violates the Fourth Amendment).
167 See Coleman, supra note 1, at 470–71 n.170 (listing various examples from across the
country).
168 See, e.g., Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Regulatory & Protective Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407
(5th Cir. 2002).
169 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008).
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best to manage Travis’s behavior, and the report to the hotline indicated that at least
some school officials believed that the plaintiff’s disciplinary techniques crossed the
line to abuse.174
In response to the hotline call, TDPRS initiated an investigation.175 During the
course of the investigation, Travis was interviewed at his school then moved to the
Child Advocacy Center (CAC) for a videotaped interview.176 Based in large part on
the information gained during the interviews of Travis and three of his brothers,
TDPRS workers, accompanied by deputies from the sheriff’s department, went to
the plaintiff’s home to interview more of Travis’s twelve siblings.177 When they ar-
rived at the home, the housekeeper allowed the TDPRS workers into the home and
they began to interview the other children.178 The plaintiff arrived home shortly after
and, according to his testimony, demanded that the TDPRS workers leave.179 They
did not leave and ultimately removed all of the children from the home and placed
them in foster homes.180 A Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship was filed
three days later.181 A hearing was conducted later that day, and the court ordered the
return of the children to their parents.182 The case against the plaintiffs was dis-
missed seven months later.183 Over the next three years, TDPRS investigated two
other reports of suspected abuse involving the plaintiffs’ children.184 No charges
were brought as a result of those investigations.185
The plaintiffs filed suit against TDPRS alleging, among other claims, that their
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the TDPRS employees entered their
home without a warrant.186 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the
Fourth Amendment applies to civil investigations conducted by social workers and
generally prohibits government entry into a home without a warrant supported by
174 Id.
175 Id. at 413.
176 Id. The Child Advocacy Center was established for the purpose of coordinating child
abuse investigations among TDPRS, law enforcement, and the district attorney’s office. Id.
By conducting interviews in a central location, children were spared the trauma of multiple
interviews by various government entities. Id.
177 Id. at 413–14.
178 Id. at 414. The TDPRS representatives claimed that the housekeeper consented to their
entrance into the home. Id. The housekeeper denied that she gave consent. Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 414–15.
181 Id. at 415. These events, including the removal of the children, took place on a Friday




184 Id. at 416.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 419.
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probable cause, consent, or exigent circumstances.187 It further acknowledged that
the Supreme Court has recognized a few circumstances in which “special needs” be-
yond the general interest in law enforcement justify a warrantless search.188 The defen-
dants alleged that the housekeeper consented to their entry and that the special needs
exception applied to their search of the home as part of a child abuse investigation.189
The court determined that there was a question of fact as to whether the house-
keeper consented to the TDPRS employees’ entry into the house,190 and it held that
there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry.191 The court then
considered whether the special needs exception to the warrant requirement applied.
It ultimately concluded that the exception did not apply and that the plaintiffs had
alleged a constitutional violation.192 “Key to the special needs doctrine . . . is that the
need must be divorced from the purpose of law enforcement.”193
Texas law requires TDPRS to notify law enforcement of all child abuse reports
and to conduct joint investigations if the report of abuse alleges that the child is at
risk of immediate physical or sexual abuse.194 In the case under consideration, the
court noted that the entry into the plaintiffs’ home to investigate the allegation of
child abuse “was closely tied with law enforcement.”195 Consequently, “because the
need to enter the Gateses’ home was not divorced from the state’s general interest
in law enforcement, there was no special need that justified the entry.”196 Some other
circuits addressing the issue have reached the same conclusion.197 Others have left
187 Id. at 419–20 (citing Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d
395, 401 (5th Cir. 2002)).
188 Id. at 420.
189 Id. at 419.
190 Id. at 421.
191 Id. at 422–23.
192 Id. at 424.
193 Id. at 423.
194 Id. The court cited its holding in Roe that “the special needs doctrine did not permit a
social worker to visually search a child’s body cavities as part of an abuse investigation with-
out a warrant or exigent circumstances. In reaching that conclusion, we noted that Texas law
requires TDPRS to notify law enforcement of all child abuse reports.” Id. (citation omitted);
see also discussion supra Part I.B.
195 Gates, 537 F.3d at 424.
196 Id.
197 See Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We find
no special need that renders the warrant requirement impracticable when social workers enter
a home to remove a child, absent exigent circumstances.”); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d
1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Officials may remove a child from the custody of its parent
without prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the
seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger
of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert
that specific injury.”); see also Siliven v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 926
(7th Cir. 2011) (citing Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)) (holding
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open the possibility that the special needs exception could apply in some child abuse
investigations.198 The Second Circuit falls into the latter category, stating: “There
may be circumstances in which the law of warrant and probable cause established
in the criminal setting does not work effectively in the child removal or child ex-
amination context.”199
The court’s conclusion in Gates—that the state’s interest in preventing child
abuse goes “beyond” law enforcement but is not “divorced” from it was paramount
in its decision not to apply the special needs exception.200 According to the Fifth
Circuit, because both of the interests are present, the standard probable cause test
must be met instead of the lower standard of reasonableness that is used when the
special needs doctrine applies.201 However, the interest in law enforcement exists
precisely because child abuse is directed at society’s most vulnerable citizens.202
Ironically, this interest in punishing child abusers makes it more difficult to prevent
child abuse. While this may be appropriate from a Fourth Amendment perspective,
it leaves vulnerable children with less protection. This is especially true in cases in
which there is some evidence of abuse but insufficient evidence to support issuance
of a warrant.
It is not clear that the Supreme Court truly requires the state’s interest to be com-
pletely separate from law enforcement. In Ferguson, for example, law enforcement
was “extensive[ly]” involved in the development, implementation, and enforcement
of the policy.203 It does not follow that any tangential law enforcement involvement
automatically prevents a policy or interest from coming within the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Indeed, the Court distin-
guished the policy at issue in that case from circumstances in which health care pro-
fessionals incidentally come across evidence of illegal activity in the course of their
treatment of a patient.204 In those cases, the health care workers may be required to
report their findings to law enforcement officials.205 However, that does not make the
that a seizure of a child from his home is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes if it is
pursuant to a court order, supported by probable cause, or if exigent circumstances exist).
198 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the court would
“refrain from deciding categorically,” that the special needs exception could never apply to
a case in which a child was removed from his or her home during the course of a child abuse
investigation).
199 Id. at 604. The Seventh Circuit has not expressly rejected application of the special
needs exception in child abuse investigations, but dicta in Doe v. Heck indicates that it would
do so if the case were presented to the court. 327 F.3d 492, 517 n.20 (7th Cir. 2003).
200 Gates, 537 F.3d at 423–24.
201 Id. at 423.
202 See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) (noting, albeit in dicta, that the
search of a home was not unreasonable because “[t]here is no more worthy object of the
public’s concern” than a child).
203 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
204 Id. at 80–81.
205 Id. at 81.
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treatment subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.206 Consequently,
despite use of the term “divorce,” the Court itself did not require a complete separa-
tion from any possible law enforcement involvement.207
If the “primary purpose” standard is applied instead, then the special needs ex-
ception could be applied in child abuse or neglect investigations.
The special needs doctrine is reserved for exceptional circum-
stances to justify a search designed to serve non–law enforcement
ends. Whether the special needs doctrine applies depends upon
the purpose of the law or policy in issue. If the primary purpose
is ordinary law enforcement, the special needs doctrine does not
apply and the search cannot be upheld under the doctrine. How-
ever, once a non-ordinary law enforcement purpose is identified,
the court conducts a reasonableness test balancing the individ-
ual’s privacy interests against the government’s special need.208
The primary purpose of child abuse investigations is ensuring the health and
well-being of children.209 Prosecution of parents or caregivers is not automatic nor
is it the focus of such investigations. The investigations and consequent searches are
intended to determine whether the allegations or suspicions of abuse or neglect are
well-founded.210 If so, the focus then becomes protecting the children from further
abuse or neglect and providing a safe environment for the children, either in foster
care, with relatives, or in the home with support services provided by the state.211
State laws regulating child abuse investigations may overlap significantly with
law enforcement regulations.212 This entanglement is intended to reduce the need for
duplicate investigative work or to minimize trauma to victims.213 For example, in
206 See id. at 84.
207 See id. at 78–82.
208 United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 320 (D. Del. 2003) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
209 See ILL. DEP’T OF CHILD & FAMILY SERVS., PROCEDURES, supra note 18, § 300.10
(Dec. 13, 2010) (“Child Protective Services (CPS) is a specialized component of the broader
public welfare system of services to children and families. The purpose of these procedures
is to define the intervention process when a report or referral is received from the community
expressing concerns that a child is or may be maltreated and the Department’s response to
those concerns. Community concerns received by the Department will be evaluated to iden-
tify families in need of protective services consistent with laws and policies pertaining to
child maltreatment and the risk of maltreatment.”).
210 See, e.g., id. § 300.50(a) (Nov. 20, 2009).
211 See, e.g., id. § 300.90(a)–(b).
212 See discussion supra Part I.A.4.
213 See, e.g., Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 413
(5th Cir. 2008).
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some states, victims are interviewed by social service investigators and police officers
jointly or in a central location to avoid requiring the victim to undergo multiple
interviews or relate traumatic events multiple times.214 The regulations also allow
evidence collected by social service workers to be used at trial against the abuser.215
However, statutes can be revised to reduce entanglement, particularly at the initial
stages of an investigation, if doing so will allow the special needs exception to apply.
If a report of abuse or neglect is received but there is insufficient evidence to support
issuance of a warrant, state law may be revised to allow for a limited, warrantless
search or seizure of the child.
Law enforcement would only participate at this stage if it was deemed necessary
for the protection of the alleged victim or the investigator. Even then, they would
not participate in the interview and, if possible, would not be present for any actual
discussion. Instead, once the child’s and investigator’s safety are assured, the law
enforcement officers could leave, remain outside of the home, or move to another
room. This would ensure that they are not involved in the search and seizure al-
though, if necessary, they would be available if the situation turned violent. To the
extent that social workers fear for their safety, it should be made clear to officers
that their presence is solely for the purpose of protecting the social worker.216 If law
enforcement officers are present under those circumstances, and even if they assist
in the searches, their presence is intended to protect the investigator and, if neces-
sary, the children; thus criminal prosecution is not the primary purpose of their
involvement. They are not there for the purpose of gathering evidence to be used
against the parents, although that may be an incidental result. To view the primary
purpose as law enforcement is to assume that the focus is on punishing the parent
rather than protecting a child.
This clarification and limitation of the law enforcement role would minimize
any concern that the primary purpose of the investigation is law enforcement.
Information gathered may still be turned over to police, but only if such information
is evidence of a crime. In this respect, such searches are analogous to the results of
medical tests being turned over to police if the results are relevant to a criminal
investigation.217 The purpose of the tests is diagnosing and treating illness. The fact




216 If, after arriving at the interview or investigation site, it becomes apparent that children
are in danger, the officer’s role may expand to include protection of the child (by removal
of the child, if exigent circumstances exist). See, e.g., ILL. DEP’T OF CHILD & FAMILY SERVS.,
PROCEDURES, supra note 18, § 300.80(f) (Nov. 20, 2009).
217 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80–81 (2001).
218 See id.
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B. Search and Seizure on Private Property Other than the Home
The Seventh Circuit has rejected the special needs exception in the context of
searches at private schools.219 In Doe v. Heck,220 social workers were notified that
corporal punishment was being used as a form of discipline at a private Christian
school.221 Child Welfare caseworkers interviewed a former student whose guardian
filed the complaint, and she identified another student, eleven-year-old John Doe, Jr.,
who she believed had also been spanked.222 Caseworkers then went to the school and
demanded that the school allow them to interview John about the alleged corporal
punishment and other family matters.223 The principal objected to the interviews with-
out a court order or parental consent, but the police allowed the caseworkers to re-
move John from his classroom and interview him over the principal’s objection.224
The caseworkers, relying on a Wisconsin statute, their training by the Bureau of Child
Welfare, the advice of the local district attorney’s office, and the advice of the attor-
ney for the Bureau, informed the school principal that they did not need a warrant
or parental consent to interview the school’s students as part of their investigation.225
According to the statute:
[t]he agency may contact, observe, or interview the child at any
location without permission from the child’s parent, guardian or
legal custodian if necessary to determine if the child is in need
of protection or services, except that the person making the inves-
tigation may enter a child’s dwelling only with permission from
the child’s parent, guardian or legal custodian or after obtaining
a court order.226
The Bureau of Child Welfare sought to interview other students on a different
occasion, but the principal refused to allow the caseworkers access.227 Having
219 Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 517 & n.20 (7th Cir. 2003).
220 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003).
221 Id. at 499. In this case, the initial report of child abuse was made by the great-
grandmother of a former student. The great-grandmother, who was one of the child’s guard-
ians, reported that her great-granddaughter had been spanked by the private school’s prin-
cipal twice and that after the second spanking the child had bruises on her back. Id. at 500.
She and her husband disagreed with the school’s corporal punishment policy and withdrew
the child from the school. Id. In her interview with the Child Welfare Bureau, the great-
grandmother also expressed concern for the other children at the school who were being
spanked. Id. She had also reported the spankings to the police who informed her that nothing
could be done since she had not taken any pictures of the bruises on the child. Id. at 501.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 502–04.
224 Id. at 502–03.
225 Id. at 503.
226 Id. at 502 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3)(c)(b)(1) (2010)).
227 Id. at 506.
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unsuccessfully attempted to interview John’s siblings and parents or to obtain suf-
ficient corroborating information, the Bureau eventually ended its investigation.228
John’s parents and the school filed suit against three caseworkers, alleging various
constitutional violations.229
The Seventh Circuit found that the investigation on the private school’s prem-
ises was undoubtedly a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.230 Moreover, the
court held that John was “seized” when the caseworkers removed him from his
classroom and placed him in another room to be interviewed.231 Thus, the only issue
was whether the search and seizure were reasonable in the absence of a warrant or
parental consent.232
The court noted that the Supreme Court has distinguished between searches and
seizures on public property and those on private property, and has held that warrant-
less searches are presumptively unreasonable when carried out on private property
unless they fall within a recognized exception.233 “Moreover, the principle that a war-
rantless search or seizure conducted on private property is unreasonable applies . . .
so long as the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises on
which the search or seizure occurred.”234 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the
Does had a reasonable expectation of privacy on the private school premises.235
Consequently, the search and seizure were unreasonable unless some recognized
exception applied.236
The defendant caseworkers relied on two Seventh Circuit cases, Darryl H. v.
Coler237 and Landstrom v. Illinois,238 in which the court held that warrantless strip
searches of students on school premises did not violate the Fourth Amendment.239
However, as the court in Doe v. Heck pointed out, those searches occurred on public
school property with the consent of public school administrators.240
228 Id. at 508.
229 Id. In addition to their Fourth Amendment claims, the plaintiffs alleged violations of
their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
230 Id. at 510.
231 Id. “[W]e conclude that John Jr. was ‘seized’ with[in] the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because no reasonable child would have believed that he was free to leave the
nursery.” Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 512.
236 Id. at 512–13.
237 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
238 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1990).
239 Heck, 327 F.3d at 513–14 (citing Landstrom v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & Family
Servs., 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1990); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986)).
240 Id. at 514.
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Citing Brokaw v. Mercer County,241 the Seventh Circuit held that the seizure of
a child on private property is unreasonable unless the government obtains a court order
supported by probable cause or if exigent circumstances exist.242 “[I]t is Brokaw, not
Darryl H. and Landstrom, that controls our decision in this case.”243 Since the court
had already concluded that the record “clearly shows that the defendants’ search of
the school and seizure of the child were not done pursuant to a court order, proba-
ble cause, or exigent circumstances,”244 the search and seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment.245 The court went on to hold that the statute upon which the case-
workers relied was unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized “government
officials to conduct an investigation of child abuse on private property without a
warrant or probable cause, consent, or exigent circumstances.”246
The Seventh Circuit was careful to note that because the defendants did not con-
tend that the special needs exception applied to the case, the court was not deciding
whether the exception could apply.247 It concluded:
Nevertheless, given that the exigent circumstances exception
already gives the State the ability to take immediate action to
ensure the physical safety of a child suspected of abuse who is
located on private property, there is no apparent justification for
carving out a “special needs” exception for child abuse investi-
gations in this context.248
Thus, although they did not do so expressly in Doe v. Heck, the Seventh Circuit has
strongly signaled that they are likely to reject the special needs exception in child
abuse and neglect investigations conducted on private property if the issue is pre-
sented for decision.
C. Search and Seizure in Public Schools
While the Fourth Amendment applies to children in public (as opposed to pri-
vate) schools,249 the scope of protection is less than that which is enjoyed in the
home.250 Nevertheless, in the context of child abuse and neglect investigations, some
courts have held that a warrant, probable cause, or parental consent are required
241 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).
242 Heck, 327 F.3d at 514.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 513.
245 Id. at 515.
246 Id. at 515–16.
247 Id. at 513.
248 Id. at 517 n.20.
249 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
250 See id. at 341.
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before a child can be searched or seized on public school property.251 Others, such
as the Seventh Circuit, have applied a more lenient rule.252
In Greene v. Camreta,253 the plaintiff had been arrested and charged with sexu-
ally abusing F.S., who was the child of family friends.254 The parents of the alleged
victim claimed that the plaintiff’s wife had expressed concern regarding the plain-
tiff’s interactions with their own daughters.255 In response to this information, social
services workers went to the plaintiff’s older daughter’s school and requested to speak
to her.256 The social worker was accompanied by a law enforcement officer.257 School
administrators pulled the daughter out of class, led her to an empty room, and left
her with the social worker and the police officer.258 The social worker asked ques-
tions while the officer stood by, armed but silent.259 The social worker claimed that
the daughter made statements indicating that she had been sexually abused by her
father.260 She later claimed that she made the incriminating statements only after
being pressured to do so by the social worker.261 The children were temporarily re-
moved from their parents’ custody, and the plaintiff went to trial for abusing F.S.
and his own daughter.262 The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the plaintiff
accepted a plea bargain with respect to the charges regarding F.S.263 The charges
regarding the alleged abuse of his daughter were dismissed.264
The plaintiff filed suit against the social worker, alleging that the seizure of his
daughter in the school violated her Fourth Amendment rights.265 The defendant so-
cial worker relied on the Court’s holding in T.L.O., which held that the traditional
251 See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the general
law of search warrants applies), vacated as moot, Greene v. Camreta 661 F.3d 1201, 1201
(9th Cir. 2011).
252 See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900–01 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the special
needs exception).
253 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court subsequently held that the Fourth
Amendment issue in Greene v. Camreta was moot. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020,
2026–27 (2011). On remand, the Ninth Circuit vacated the part of its opinion dealing with
the Fourth Amendment. Greene v. Camreta, 661 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011). This Article
assumes that but for the mootness issue, the Ninth Circuit’s original holding would be good
law. See Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011.
254 Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1016.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1017.
258 Id.
259 Id. The child stated that she was not scared by the officer and that she trusted him. Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 1019–20.
263 Id. at 1020.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 1020, 1022.
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warrant requirement does not apply in the school setting.266 The Ninth Circuit re-
jected that argument, noting that the circumstances of T.L.O. were very different
from the circumstances in Camreta.267 In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the “special need”
recognized by the Court in T.L.O. was the need for efficient and effective disci-
pline.268 No such need compelled the interview (seizure) of the child in Camreta.269
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that in T.L.O., the Supreme Court explicitly re-
frained from expressing an opinion about searches conducted by, on behalf of, or in
conjunction with law enforcement personnel.270
The court then analyzed whether the special needs exception should apply in the
context of child abuse investigations at school.271 Ultimately it held that the law en-
forcement purpose and involvement in the seizure were too pervasive to allow the
court to apply the special needs exception.272 The Ninth Circuit stated that “the Court
hasn’t relaxed traditional Fourth Amendment protections when the main purpose of
an ostensibly administrative search was to gather evidence for use in subsequent
criminal proceedings, or when law enforcement personnel were substantially in-
volved in the design and implementation of the administrative program.”273
In Camreta, the law enforcement officer was present during the interview of the
plaintiff’s daughter.274 Moreover, the plaintiff had already been arrested and charged
with sexual abuse of F.S., and the investigation in connection with that case was
ongoing.275 Thus, the interview was intended not only to determine whether the plain-
tiff’s daughters had been or were in danger of being abused, but also to gather evi-
dence that could be used to show that plaintiff had abused F.S.276 Finally, the Oregon
statutory scheme revealed a “broader entanglement of law enforcement and social
services officials in the state’s investigation of child abuse.”277
Having decided that the special needs exception did not apply, the Ninth Circuit
applied the traditional Fourth Amendment standard and concluded that the seizure,
which occurred without a warrant or equivalent court order, without exigent circum-
stances, and without parental consent, was unconstitutional.278 The Ninth Circuit
266 Id. at 1023.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 1024.
269 Id. at 1025.
270 Id. at 1024.
271 Id. at 1025.
272 Id. at 1027–28.
273 Id. at 1027.
274 Id.
275 Id. “Once the police have initiated a criminal investigation into alleged abuse in the
home, responsible officials must provide procedural protections appropriate to the criminal
context.” Id. at 1030.
276 Id. at 1027.
277 Id. at 1028.
278 Id. at 1030.
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noted that it was not deciding whether the special needs doctrine could apply in the ab-
sence of a direct law enforcement purpose and without law enforcement involvement.279
In Tenenbaum v. Williams,280 a kindergarten teacher reported that her student,
Sarah, might have been sexually abused.281 The report was based on statements that
Sarah made to the teacher indicating that her father had hurt her and based on the
fact that the child pointed to the groin area of a doll when asked where he hurt her.282
Social workers removed Sarah from her public school classroom and took her to a
hospital for examination by a pediatrician and gynecologist to determine whether
there was evidence of sexual abuse.283 No evidence of abuse was found, and Sarah
was returned to her parents.284 No further action was taken against the Tenenbaums,
and the claims were designated “unfounded.”285
The Tenenbaums brought suit against the social worker, supervisor, and others
involved in the investigation.286 Among the claims was the allegation that by re-
moving Sarah from school and taking her to the hospital for examination, the social
workers violated Sarah’s Fourth Amendment rights.287 The Second Circuit agreed
that the actions constituted a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes.288 It was
undisputed that no warrant or equivalent court order was obtained before the seizure,
therefore the question before the court was whether “the ordinary probable-cause
standard applicable to, among others, law enforcement officials making warrantless ar-
rests also apply to caseworkers seizing children without prior court authorization.”289
279 Id. at 1027 n.12.
280 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999).
281 Id. at 588.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 591. Before taking this step, the social workers visited the Tenenbaums at their
home and interviewed the parents. Id. at 589. They also examined Sarah’s and her brother’s
partially unclothed bodies for evidence of abuse; none was found. Id. The children were left
with their parents that evening. Id. at 589–90. Four days later, the supervisor decided to have
Sarah removed from school and examined for evidence of sexual abuse at the hospital. Id.
at 590. During the intervening days, the social worker had met with Sarah’s teacher, who
confirmed the information contained in the initial report made to social services. Id. at 590.
The supervisor’s decision was also based on the fact that he believed the Tenenbaums ig-
nored the command to call his office, which he believed showed that they were not taking
the sexual abuse allegations seriously. Id. The Tenenbaums claimed they were never in-
structed to call his office. Id. Moreover, it was undisputed that when the social workers
visited their home, they asked only about Sarah’s developmental delays and her habit of
falling asleep in class. Id. at 589. At the supervisor’s insistence, the Tenenbaums were not
told of the sexual abuse allegations. Id.
284 Id. at 591.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 581–82.
287 Id. at 601.
288 Id. at 602.
289 Id. at 603.
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The court considered whether the special needs exception should apply, thereby
relieving the caseworkers of the need to establish probable cause or obtain a
warrant.290 After noting the split among the circuits on this issue, the Second Circuit
declined to answer the question definitively but refused to apply the special needs
exception in the Tenenbaum case.291 The court noted that “[t]here may be circum-
stances in which the law of warrant and probable cause established in the criminal
setting does not work effectively in the child removal or child examination context.
This is not such a case.”292 Thus, the Second Circuit left open the possibility that the
special needs exception could justify warrantless searches or seizures in the child
abuse investigation context, although it did not elaborate on the facts that would
support such a holding.
The Seventh Circuit has refused to require a warrant or probable cause before
a child can be searched on public school grounds.293 In Darryl H. v. Coler, the plain-
tiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief for alleged constitutional violations.294
Specifically, they sought to enjoin enforcement of the Illinois Department of Chil-
dren and Family Services (DCFS) policy that allowed caseworkers to conduct war-
rantless “physical examination[s] of [a] child’s body for evidence of abuse.”295 The
Illinois policy at issue was articulated in a handbook and policy memorandum.296
According to the Illinois handbook, five criteria (“hot-line criteria”) must be met
in order for DCFS to investigate an allegation of abuse or neglect.297 If the hot-line
criteria are met, the caseworker must conduct an investigation, which may include
an examination of the child to verify allegations of abuse.298 If a physical examina-
tion is to be conducted, the caseworker has the option of: requiring the caretaker to
take the child to a physician for examination; taking the child to a physician for
examination; disrobing the child and conducting a cursory physical examination
while the caretaker is present; or permitting the school nurse to examine the child.299
290 Id. at 603–04.
291 Id. at 604.
292 Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
293 Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1986).
294 Id. at 897.
295 Id. at 894. Note that the Illinois handbook guidelines discussed in Part I of this Article
are a revised version of the procedures discussed in Darryl H. See supra Part I.A.
296 Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 895.
297 Id. Those five criteria are:
(1) a child less than eighteen years old is involved; (2) the child was
either harmed or in danger of harm; (3) a specific incident of abuse is
identified; (4) a parent, caretaker, sibling or babysitter is the alleged
perpetrator of neglect; or (5) a parent, caretaker, adult family member,
adult individual residing in the child’s home, parent’s paramour, sibling
or babysitter is the alleged perpetrator of abuse.
Id.
298 Id. at 895–96.
299 Id. at 896. In cases of alleged sexual abuse, a physician must conduct the examination.
Id. If the child is over the age of thirteen, the caseworker conducting a physical examination
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In the case of one of the plaintiffs, DCFS caseworkers received an anonymous
report that B.D. had been beaten by his father.300 The caseworker went to B.D.’s
school and conducted an examination of B.D., during which the boy was required
to remove his pants so that the caseworker could examine his back and buttocks.301
The other plaintiff’s case involved a call by a child’s mother to DCFS seeking fam-
ily counseling.302 During the call, the mother disclosed that her husband had kicked
and shoved her son, A.O., who was her husband’s stepson.303 A caseworker later went
to A.O.’s school and examined A.O. for evidence of abuse.304 During that examina-
tion, A.O. was required to remove his shirt and pants.305 In neither case did the case-
worker have a warrant or parental consent to conduct the examinations.306
The plaintiffs claimed that both examinations violated the Fourth Amendment,
and they sought to enjoin DCFS from searching children without parental consent
or probable cause.307 The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion based, in part, on its finding that while the examinations were searches that
implicated the Fourth Amendment, the searches were reasonable and, therefore, con-
stitutional.308 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the examinations were Fourth Amend-
ment searches and agreed with the district court with respect to the reasonableness
of the searches.309 The court stated, “On this record, we believe that the district judge
was correct in holding that the searches in question here could be conducted without
meeting the strictures of probable cause or the warrant requirement.”310 However, the
court was not willing to go so far as to hold that any search conducted in accordance
with DCFS policy would be reasonable.311 The court stated, “[W]e are somewhat less
convinced, at least on this record, that a nude body search may be constitutionally
conducted in every instance in which the hot-line criteria are met.”312
The Court noted that the searches at issue took place in school but did not dis-
cuss the constitutional implications of that location.313 Although the court did not
must be of the same sex as the child. Id. If the child is severely ill, the child must be seen
immediately by a physician. Id.






306 See id. It is unclear whether a “caretaker” was present during the examinations as
required by the policy, but this issue was not raised in the opinion. Darryl H., 801 F.2d 893.
307 Id. at 897.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 901.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id. Note that DCFS policy now requires parental consent or a court order to conduct
a strip search of a child over the parent’s objection. See supra Part I.A.
313 See Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 896–97.
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discuss the diminished expectations of privacy in school (compared with the home);
it did note that other plaintiffs that were a part of the district court case alleged that
home searches violated the Fourth Amendment.314 However, none of those plaintiffs
were a part of the instant appeal.315 Thus, the court made it clear that it was not de-
ciding whether a home search consistent with DCFS policy was constitutional.316
Because the location of the search was not discussed in depth as part of the Fourth
Amendment analysis,317 it is unclear to what extent the fact that the searches took
place in school influenced the court’s decision.
While the Seventh Circuit did not expressly address the special needs excep-
tion,318 it did address concerns about whether the constitutionally required standards
for criminal investigations should apply to these searches.319 The court stated:
[W]hile the visual inspection of the child’s body may eventually
result in a criminal proceeding against a child abuser, that con-
tingency is certainly of secondary importance to the DCFS at the
time the search is conducted. Of prime importance is the safety of
the child, and the stabilization of the home environment. Under
these circumstances, we cannot say that the Constitution requires
that a visual inspection of the body of a child who may have
been the victim of child abuse can only be undertaken when the
standards of probable cause or a warrant are met.320
D. Strip Searches
After concluding that a warrant was not necessary to conduct a strip search of
a child in Darryl H. v. Coler, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that this conclusion
did not resolve the question.321 Specifically, the court had to determine whether the
DCFS policies in the handbook ensured that searches conducted in accordance with




317 See id. at 902–04 (discussing the “reasonableness” requirement).
318 T.L.O. had been decided only a year earlier, and the term “special needs” had not yet
been widely used, nor had the exception been developed beyond the facts of that case. See
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
319 Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 902.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 902.
322 Id. at 903–04. “[W]e must now assess whether this record supports the conclusion of
the district judge that, criteria contained in the Handbook ensure that, under all circum-
stances, the searches conducted by the DCFS are reasonable.” Id. at 903.
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search was justified at its inception and whether “the conduct of the search [was]
‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.’”323
The court was most concerned about whether searches authorized by the hand-
book would always be justified at their inception.324 The court noted that the hand-
book did not require caseworkers to seek other sources of information in order to
verify abuse allegations, even when they had the time and the opportunity to do
so.325 The court commented that it did not “understand why the caseworker cannot be
instructed to make, as time and circumstances permit, at least some effort to verify
reports which are received from minors, anonymous callers, or sources whose reli-
ability might be reasonably suspect.”326 Additionally, the court was concerned that
the handbook made no attempt to distinguish between searches of the very young and
searches of older children.327 These concerns led the court to conclude that at that pre-
liminary stage of litigation, “the Handbook, as it now exists, ensures that the searches
will always be reasonable.”328 In other words, while the handbook criteria would lead
to reasonable searches in some cases, there might be circumstances in which such
searches would be unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Warrantless strip searches were categorically rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Roe
v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.329 In June 1999, the
Texas Children’s Protective Services (CPS) Statewide Intake Unit received a call
concerning Jackie, a young child who was alleged to have been acting in a manner
that indicated that she might have been sexually abused.330 The case was assigned
to social worker Strickland, who eventually contacted Mrs. Roe, Jackie’s mother.331
Strickland informed Mrs. Roe that she had received a referral regarding Jackie,
although she would not discuss the details and insisted that they talk in person.332
They agreed that Strickland would visit Mrs. Roe’s house the next morning.333





328 Id. at 904. Because the plaintiffs could potentially establish that the handbook criteria
were not reasonable under all circumstances, the court concluded that there was some like-
lihood that the plaintiffs could succeed on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim. Id.
329 299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002).
330 Id. at 398. While attending day camp, Jackie was alleged to have been seen touching
the “private parts” of another six-year-old girl, kissing the girl on the lips, and dancing in a
sexually suggestive manner. Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 398–99.
333 Id. at 399.
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When Strickland arrived at the home the next morning, she explained the call
that the Intake Unit had received and the purpose of her visit.334 When Mrs. Roe
asked whether she should contact an attorney, Strickland assured her that it was not
necessary.335 After some discussion, Strickland told Mrs. Roe that she (Strickland)
needed to take some pictures of Jackie, although she did not specify what type of
pictures.336 Mrs. Roe was not given the option of refusing to allow the pictures or
examination.337 Strickland, who had no training in taking pictures of children’s gen-
italia, asked Mrs. Roe to remove Jackie’s upper clothing.338 Mrs. Roe complied, and
Strickland checked her for marks and bruises but found none.339 Strickland then asked
Mrs. Roe to remove Jackie’s underwear.340 Mrs. Roe questioned the necessity of such
action, but Strickland assured her that it was more stressful for Mrs. Roe than for
Jackie.341 Strickland then took pictures of Jackie’s internal and external vaginal and
anal areas.342
After taking the pictures, Strickland interviewed Jackie for fifteen to twenty min-
utes, had a brief discussion with Mrs. Roe, and then left.343 CPS ultimately “ruled
out” abuse and closed the case.344 The incident caused Jackie to have frequent night-
mares and anxiety, for which she received counseling.345 Mrs. Roe and Jackie’s father,
Mr. Doe, sued Strickland and the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory
Services (TDPRS) on Jackie’s behalf,346 claiming that the search of Jackie without
a court order violated her Fourth Amendment rights.347
The Fifth Circuit noted that it had not previously addressed whether the special
needs exception applied to a social worker’s visual search of a child’s body cavities,
and it acknowledged that while the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, there
was a split among the other circuits that had confronted it.348 The court then exam-
ined the cases in which the Supreme Court had applied the special needs exception
334 Id. Mrs. Roe claimed that Strickland entered the home without permission or an invi-
tation; Strickland claimed that she was invited to enter. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that Mrs.
Roe consented to the entry. Id. at 402.







342 Id. “Strickland took pictures of Jackie’s vagina and buttocks in a closed position, and
then instructed Mrs. Roe to spread Jackie’s labia and buttocks, so that she could take pictures
of the genital and anal areas.” Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id. Mrs. Roe also experienced symptoms of depression following the incident. Id.
346 Id. at 398.
347 Id. at 400.
348 Id. at 403.
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and attempted to determine whether strip searches in child abuse investigations fit
within that category of cases.349
The court first recognized that strip searches implicate fundamental Fourth
Amendment rights.350 “The Court has never upheld a ‘special needs’ search where
the person’s expectation of privacy was as strong as is Jackie’s interest in bodily
privacy.”351 The fact that the search occurred in her home only strengthened the
privacy interest.352 The entanglement of law enforcement also tipped the scales in
Jackie’s favor.353 Citing Ferguson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Supreme
Court would not recognize the special needs exception in a case in which the
“special need” is not “divorced” from a general law enforcement purpose.354 The
court concluded:
Strickland ultimately fails to identify a “special need” separate
from the purposes of general law enforcement. Identifying the
goal of protecting a child’s welfare and removing him from an
abusive home is easy; disentangling that goal from general law
enforcement purposes is difficult. . . . Texas law describes so-
cial workers’ investigations as a tool both for gathering evi-
dence for criminal convictions and for protecting the welfare of
the child. Ferguson teaches that we must apply the traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis where a child protective services
search is so intimately intertwined with law enforcement.355
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that to justify a strip search of a child, a so-
cial worker must obtain a warrant or a court order supported by probable cause,
receive parental consent, or identify exigent circumstances to justify a strip search
of a child.356
V. WARRANTLESS BUT REASONABLE SEARCHES (NOT SPECIAL NEEDS)
In theory, even if the special needs exception is not applied, a warrantless search
may be conducted without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.357 Just as the
349 See id. at 404.
350 Id.




355 Id. at 406–07.
356 Id. at 407–08.
357 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a police officer may con-
duct a limited, warrantless search and seizure of suspects when he has “reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
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Supreme Court adopted an alternative to the warrant standard in T.L.O. (that later
became known as the special needs exception), the Court could simply adopt a war-
rantless standard that applies to child abuse and neglect cases. The decision to adopt
the alternative standard, rather than simply apply the special needs exception, could
reflect the unique conflict created by the role of law enforcement in abuse and ne-
glect cases and the compelling interest of the state in protecting children. The advan-
tage to this approach is that the Court could spell out the circumstances in which a
warrantless search would be justified and outline the permissible scope of such a
search. Above all, the search would still need to comply with the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.358 Thus, social workers would still need to
establish that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable.
If the Court does not provide guidance with respect to what circumstances would
justify a warrantless search or seizure and define the scope of such a search or sei-
zure, regulations or case law could be developed to guide investigators regarding
reasonable and unreasonable investigative conduct. Even absent specific guidelines,
investigators can use judgment informed by the reality that warrantless searches and
seizures must be used only as a last resort, when justified by the circumstances, and
limited in such a way as to make it reasonable in all respects.359
A. Last Resort
If the investigator can conduct portions of an investigation without entering the
home or interviewing the child, those steps should be taken first. For example, if the
child attends school, the social worker can and should interview teachers or other
school personnel who have had the opportunity to observe the child. Other sources
of information such as preschool or day care workers, church members, neighbors,
or friends may be able to provide sufficient information to either close the investiga-
tion or support the issuance of a warrant. Parents can also be interviewed to explain
or respond to the allegations. Absent a warrant, none of these sources can be com-
pelled to cooperate with the investigations, but if they choose to cooperate, searching
the child may not be necessary.
B. Justified by the Circumstances
If there is still not enough evidence to obtain a warrant, the investigator must
evaluate the evidence that is available and determine whether it is sufficient and
credible enough to justify further action. For example, the source of the allegations
may have questionable credibility, but the allegations may be specific, detailed and
cause to arrest the individual for a crime”); see also, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983) (extending the protective search doctrine to the interior of automobiles).
358 Roe, 299 F.3d at 404.
359 Id.
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easily corroborated or disproved by a cursory examination of the child. If so, a war-
rantless search or seizure may be appropriate. Specifically, if the only avenue avail-
able to investigate the allegations is to interview the child, then such an interview
may be reasonable even without parental consent, and even if the interview takes
place in the home.360
C. Reasonable in All Respects
In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment, the interview must be reason-
able in all respects, including the time, place, duration, and scope.361 The interview
should normally take place during the day, in a place where the child is comfortable,
and should be limited to questions relevant to the allegations that triggered the in-
vestigation. Likewise, any visual inspection should be conducted only if the report
of abuse alleged physical injury, and should be limited to the area alleged to have
been injured. For example, if the report claims that the child has bruises on his arm,
the child could be required to roll up his sleeves so that the social worker can ex-
amine his arms. The social worker could not, however, require the child to lift his
pant legs or his shirt for examination of the legs or torso.362
The interview should be as brief as possible, and the parent or guardian may be
allowed to be present during the interview. In short, the interview should be treated
as a fact-finding mission aimed at minimizing the intrusion on the child’s privacy
interests and the adverse impact on the child’s emotional well-being. It should not
be an interrogation aimed at getting to the truth at all costs. While not all injuries
will be visible and a child might be less forthcoming in the presence of the parent,
serious abuse may be apparent, and the interview may provide enough information
to allow the caseworker to get a warrant to conduct more intrusive searches or sei-
zures. It may also uncover other sources of information that might provide informa-
tion to corroborate either the abuse allegations or the parents’ denial. Likewise, the
worker may be able to determine that a child has not been abused or neglected, and
the case may be closed. Undoubtedly, there will be times when a limited search or
seizure yields no useful information. However, there is no perfect solution when
360 See ILL. DEP’T OF CHILD & FAMILY SERVS., PROCEDURES, supra note 18, § 300.70(b)
(Nov. 20, 2009).
361 See, e.g., CPS Handbook, supra note 70, § 2241.
362 The exception would be the child’s genital regions. If sexual abuse is alleged, the
social worker should be allowed to inspect the child’s genitals only pursuant to a warrant or
probable cause. Such searches should be conducted only by specially trained medical pro-
fessionals in the presence of a parent or guardian, so long as the parent or guardian does not
interfere with the examination. If the child is able to understand the nature of the allegations
and the need for the examination, the child’s consent should be sought, and the child should
be able to identify a trusted adult (other than an alleged perpetrator) who can accompany the
child during the examination. This might also be an appropriate situation for requiring a court
order based on reasonable suspicion. See discussion supra Part III.
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there are no other sources of information available, and limited searches are likely
to uncover the most severe abuse or obvious neglect while still respecting the Fourth
Amendment’s protections.
On the other hand, a more intrusive search—such as a strip search or search of
a child’s genitals—will usually be unreasonable.363 Moreover, a search of a home
based solely on anonymous, vague allegations of abuse or neglect may not be rea-
sonable.364 While hidden scars or evidence of sexual abuse will not be uncovered in
these situations, more intrusive examinations would likely be unreasonable under
the circumstances. Moreover, obvious signs of abuse or neglect could be detected and
serve as the basis for a warrant for a more thorough (and intrusive) investigation.
It must also be noted that state actors should be held accountable for the way in
which interviews or searches are conducted. A reasonable search can be conducted
in an unreasonable manner.365 A search that might be reasonable during daylight
hours might be unreasonable in the middle of the night. An interview conducted in
a hostile tone with several persons unknown to the child may be unreasonable even
though the same interview, conducted in a gentler tone and with fewer persons present,
may be reasonable.
Another possibility, if an abuse allegation is made and the parents will not con-
sent to an interview with the child, is to require the parents to get a signed phy-
sician’s statement verifying that the child does not bear any signs of neglect or abuse.
The parents can choose the physician (subject to some restrictions—i.e., not one of
the parents or an immediate relative), and no government official need be present
at the examination. The physician need not submit any findings, test results, or infor-
mation beyond a statement that there are no signs of neglect or abuse. The cost of
the examination may be paid by the state (perhaps subject to reimbursement if evi-
dence of neglect or abuse is discovered).
This is still a search, and it does infringe on an expectation of privacy, but it is
a limited intrusion that may meet the requirement of “reasonableness” in circum-
stances in which there is no other way for social workers to investigate abuse alle-
gations. The conclusions of the physician need not be considered dispositive, but
they may provide sufficient evidence of abuse or refute allegations of abuse in some
cases. In any event, it would provide more information and, at least potentially,
dispense with the need for a search of the home or for an interview with the child.
The parents or guardians also could be required to submit to an interview with
the social services representative, either at the home or some other location. This
could qualify as a search and seizure, if participation is mandatory (i.e., they are not
363 See, e.g., Roe, 299 F.3d at 409 (holding that a strip search raises Fourth Amendment
concerns).
364 See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 903 (7th Cir. 1986).
365 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (holding that searches must
always be “reasonable” but that what is reasonable depends upon the context of each case).
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free to leave),366 although it is less likely to be considered a seizure if they are allowed
to leave, even if leaving triggers some other consequence.367 Abuse and neglect in-
vestigators would be allowed to question parents or guardians to allow them to
provide evidence or explanations to refute abuse allegations. Denials alone would
not necessarily result in closing the case, but the interviews could provide other
information or evidence that could be used to further the investigation or even sup-
port issuance of a warrant.
CONCLUSION
The inevitable conflict between protecting children from abuse or neglect and
protecting the privacy rights of the parents who might be guilty of inflicting that
abuse or neglect creates a situation in which there are no easy answers. However,
this Article advocates an approach that relieves child abuse and neglect investigators
of the burden of establishing probable cause before interviewing or examining
alleged victims, while limiting the scope of the investigation or requiring that a court
order be issued based on reasonable suspicion. These alternatives strike a balance
necessary to accommodate the interests of all concerned without sacrificing the
safety and well-being of vulnerable children.
366 See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 510 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A person has been ‘seized’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave.”).
367 See CPS Handbook, supra note 70, § 2241.1.
